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“Let wealth come in by comely thrift, And not by any sordid
shift; ‘Tis haste Makes waste; Extremes still have their fault.
Who gripes too hard the dry and slipp’ry sand, Holds none at
all, or little, in his hand.”1
I. Introduction
The excerpt from Robert Herrick’s poem, “Connubii Flores, or The
Wellwishers at Weddings” was written as advice given from the chorus of
old men to the newlyweds on their wedding day, but perhaps it could be
taken as sound business advice for those in the oil and gas industry as well.
Horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, for all practical purposes,
have been synonymous in the United States’ rise to becoming one of the
world’s leaders in oil and gas production. Horizontal drilling provides for
greater production than wells drilled vertically because it allows operators
to access more of the wellbore in the production zone. Perhaps even more
important, hydraulic fracturing provides a method to increase the
production exponentially by allowing for oil and gas extraction from tight
formations that were at one time thought impossible. While the industry has
expanded and prospered greatly during this innovative era, it has also had
the unintended effect of contributing to a considerable drop in oil and gas
prices. But, with any boom and bust, the result is often a reorganization of
operational strategies aimed at becoming more efficient and streamlined to
sustain the bust, while preparing for the next boom.

1. Robert Herrick, HESPERIDES: OR, THE WORKS BOTH HUMANE & DIVINE (1648).
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Even so, being more efficient in certain areas can sometimes have its
downside too. Recently, operators have turned their efficiency focus
towards frac sand. Traditionally, operators have obtained frac sand from the
Northern Midwest, where the highest quality and best-suited sand is
located. Transportation and logistics, however, can account for as much as
two-thirds of the cost because the sand must often travel thousands of miles
to reach where it is needed. Mindful, operators have started looking for
cheaper alternatives closer to their operations due to the climate of the
market. One thing operators have perhaps not considered are the
implications for the lessor and his interests that arise from the implied
covenants of the oil and gas lease.
This comment argues that the development of new sources of frac sand
in the United States, while economically beneficial to operators,
nonetheless inferior in quality, might lead to litigation between lessors and
lessees over obligations arising from the development and protection of the
lease. Part II introduces the history and method of hydraulic fracturing, the
value of frac sand to the process, and discusses new developments in the
frac sand needed to carry out these operations. Part III outlines the
obligations that arise through implied covenants in oil and gas leases,
discusses the standard of performance for such obligations, and compares
how oil and gas states’ case law and statutes recognize these implied
covenants. Part IV discusses the potential for new litigation that could arise
from hydraulic fracturing operations when an operator chooses to use sand
from an in-basin sand mine and examines three hypothetical situations that
could arise.
II. Hydraulic Fracturing
A. The History and Evolution of Fracing
Hydraulic fracturing has revolutionized oil and gas production in the
United States by making it both accessible and financially feasible. The
process of hydraulic fracturing, however, is not new to the oil and gas
industry. Despite its recent prevalence, hydraulic fracturing technology has
been used to stimulate the production of oil and gas wells for almost
seventy years.2 The continued improvement of hydraulic fracturing
technology has allowed for the development of several unconventional
2. See A Historic Perspective, FRACFOCUS, https://fracfocus.org/hyraulic-fracturinghow-it-works/history-hydraulic-fracturing (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (noting that hydraulic
fracturing was first used in the United States during the late 1940s).
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reservoirs, in particularly tight-shale formations.3 In fact, nearly eighty
percent of production from these unconventional formations would be
virtually impossible if not for hydraulic fracturing.4 Producers have used
hydraulic fracturing in the completion of over one million producing wells,
with an estimated 35,000 wells fractured each year.5 Oil produced from
wells that are fractured account for more than half of all production of oil in
the United States, with output nearly doubling over the past decade.6 The
advent of horizontal drilling combined with hydraulic fracturing makes the
production from tight shale formations economical; consequently, the
United States has become one of the leading producers of oil and natural
gas in the world.7
B. What is Hydraulic Fracturing
Once a well reaches “TD”—total depth for drilling—production casing
is set, through the use of cement, in the producing formation. Alternatively,
operators may plan for an open-hole production, in which, no casing is set
because production will come directly from the formation. After the
drilling operations have left the location, a “fracing” crew will move on and
prepare to start hydraulic fracturing of the production formation. If a
production string is set, perforations are made in the casing that allows for
the flow of fracing fluid and eventual production. Though the process is
essentially the same for each well, the design will depend on the conditions
and formation of each well.8
Hydraulic fracturing is a multi-stage process that pumps large volumes
of fracturing fluid downhole under high pressure to create and enhance the
natural fractures in the production formation.9 The fluid used in hydraulic

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Matt Egan, Oil Milestone: Fracking Fuels Half of U.S. Output, CNN MONEY, (Mar.
24, 2016, 12:40 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/24/investing/fracking-shale-oilboom/index.html.
7. See Robert Rapier, How the Shale Boom Turned the World Upside Down, FORBES,
(Apr. 21, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2017/04/21/how-the-shaleboom-turned-the-world-upside-down/#5711c39877d2.
8. See Hydraulic Fracturing: The Process, FRACFOCUS, https://fracfocus.org/
hydraulic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydraulic-fracturing-process (last visited Oct. 18, 2017)
(“[W]hile the process remains essentially the same, the sequence may change depending
upon unique local conditions.”).
9. Id.
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fracturing consists mostly of a mixture of water and sand.10 Water carries
the sand, a proppant, into the open fractures; the sand will “prop” or keep
open the fractures after pressure is reduced in the wellbore.11 This
stimulates production of the well by “creat[ing] paths that increase the rate
at which fluids can be produced from the reservoir formations, in some
cases by many hundreds of percent.”12 Because hydrocarbons would remain
trapped within in the formation with no way out, hydraulic fracturing is
essential to production in these formations.
C. The Importance of Frac Sand
Given the significance of hydraulic fracturing to the oil and gas industry,
one can easily conceive that the demand for sand used in this process has
grown exponentially. Some estimates show that total sand production in the
United States has quadrupled since 2014, with the oil and gas industry share
accounting for twenty-five percent in 2014 and more than seventy percent
in 2015.13 “A hydraulic fracturing job on one well can require a few
thousand tons of sand.”14 What may be less apparent is the importance of
the type of sand used in the hydraulic fracturing process. “Frac sand” must
meet very demanding industry specifications because it remains in the
fractures, to help keep them propped open after the hydraulic fracturing
process is complete.15 Frac sand standards are determined by the American
Petroleum Institute (“API”) and the International Organization for
Standards (“ISO”).16 The API/ISO standards criteria include among others:
high silica content, homogenous grain size, high sphericity and roundness,
and high crush resistance.17 High silica content (95–99 %) is indicative of
10. Id. (“Water and sand make up 98 to 99.5 percent of the fluid used in hydraulic
fracturing.”).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. North American FracSand Consumption Will Grow with Drastic Shift in End Users,
UNIV. OF TEXAS BUREAU OF ECONOMIC GEOLOGY’S ECONOMIC MINERALS PROGRAM (last
visited Oct. 22, 2017), http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/thinkcorner/CEE_SnapshotFrac_Sands-Jan17.pdf.
14. What is Frac Sand?, GEOLOGY.COM, http://geology.com/articles/frac-sand/ (last
visited Oct. 15, 2007) (“Between 2005 and 2015, the amount of frac sand used by the oil and
gas industry had increased dramatically.”).
15. See id.
16. See Benson, M.E., and Wilson, A.B., Frac Sand in the United States—A Geological
and Industry Overview, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OPEN-FILE REPORT 2015–1107 at 2
(2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.3133/ofr20151107.
17. Id. at 2–6.
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the sand used as frac sand, with the most premium being ninety-nine
percent or greater silica.18 Homogenous grain size is important in frac sand
to allow for permeability.19 “The greater roundness [and] sphericity
provides better porosity [and] permeability between grains, allowing better
flow of oil and gas from the fractures to the wellhead.”20 Another important
factor of frac sand is the crush resistance necessary to hold open the
fractures in the formation; the higher the percentage of silica in the sand,
the higher its crush resistance.21
The highest-quality frac sand, designated as Tier One, is predominately
found in the upper Midwest of the United States, and is referred to as
“Ottawa” or “Northern White” sand.22 The API/ISO standards for frac sand
are modeled after the properties of Ottawa/Northern White sands.23 As the
need for hydraulic fracturing in the oil industry continues to grow, so too
will the need for frac sand—primarily Tier One. The amount of sand being
used per well in the industry has, on average, increased by fifty percent on a
year to year basis.24 With this increase in consumption, the challenge
becomes supply and logistics. For example, where it once took twenty
railcar loads of sand to fracture one well, it now takes seventy-five loads;
“that means that each frac job has gone from consuming 4 million pounds
to 15 million pounds of sand.”25 Interestingly, the cost of Tier One sand
itself is only about half the cost to operators, or in some cases less;
transportation costs and logistics can account for as much as two-thirds of
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 53. (“In 2014, approximately 70 percent of the silica sand used for proppant
was mined in the Great Lakes Region, which included Illinois, Minnesota, Michigan, and
Wisconsin. Wisconsin and, to a lesser extent, Illinois and Minnesota are the primary
producers of the Nation’s highest quality frac sand. Wisconsin accounts for nearly one-half
of all the frac sand capacity in the United States owing to its premium sand deposits, railway
infrastructure, and long-term presence in the industry.”); see also Taso Melisaris, Not All
Frac Sand is Created Equal, FAIRMOUNTSANTROL, http://fairmountsantrol.com/blog/oilgas/well-challenges/not-frac-sand-created-equal/ (Oct. 11, 2016) (noting that northern white
sand is premium Tier 1); Keith Schaefer, The Big Opportunity in US Energy Right Now—
and Why, OIL AND GAS INVESTMENTS BULLETIN, https://oilandgas-investments.com/2015/oiland-gas-financial/the-big-opportunity-in-us-energy-right-now-and-why/ (Apr. 28, 2015)
(“Wisconsin—a northern state that borders Lake Superior—holds almost all the Tier 1 frac
sand in the USA.”).
23. Id. at 2.
24. Schaefer, supra note 22.
25. Id.
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the end cost.26 This adds huge costs to get Tier One sands to tight shale
plays in areas such as Texas and Oklahoma. “Depending on the modes of
transport, distances traveled, and number of transfer points, the cost of
white silica frac sand proppant may reach $170 per ton by the time it arrives
at the well site.”27 Down turn in oil market prices and the need to control
cost for profit margins, have led many operators to look for frac sand closer
to home.28
D. Shift Towards In-basin Frac Sand
The decline in oil prices have made operators contemplate different areas
where they can reduce costs. Until a few years ago, Northern White frac
sand was the “industry standard” used in 100% of wells that were hydraulic
fractured.29 Now, Northern White only accounts for about two-thirds of the
frac sand used in the United States.30 In Texas, the Permian Basin alone is
expected to double its share of frac sand consumption by the year 2020.31
With this in mind, several new sand mining operations have recently started
development in Texas and surrounding areas.32 These new “in-basin” mines
are different from the “Brown sand” typically associated with Texas
because the “[f]rac sand produced from the in-basin mines is sourced from
sand dunes rather than from formations beneath the Earth’s surface that
require mining.”33 Estimations show that these new mines could provide as
much as forty-five million tons of sand each year, with transportation costs
being much lower because of the proximity to where the hydraulic
fracturing jobs take place.34 In comparison, Northern White sand would
have to travel almost ten times the distance as sand mined in Texas; with
26. Id.
27. Benson, supra note 16.
28. Schaefer, supra note 22.
29. See Hana Askren, Texas Frac Sand in Demand, FORBES, (Sept. 14, 2017, 1:41 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mergermarket/2017/09/14/texas-frac-sand-indemand/#41ae6f7e469e.
30. Id.
31. North American FracSand Consumption Will Grow, supra note 13.
32. Askren, supra note 29 (noting that tens of new mines are starting up in Texas and
surrounding states.); see also Rich Kremer, Texas Frac Sand Boom May Hurt Wisconsin
Mines, WISCONSIN PUBLIC RADIO, (July 30, 2017, 4:14 PM), https://wpr.org/print/texas-fracsand-boom-may-hurt-wisconsin-mines.
33. Thomas Parambil Jacob, How the Brown Sand Bonanza Impacts US Shale Plays,
IHS MARKIT, (Aug. 17, 2017), https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/how-brown-sandsupply-impacts-us-shale-plays.html.
34. Kremer, supra note 32.
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cost of transportation potentially exceeding $100 per ton versus $20–$50
per ton for Texas sand.35
One potential drawback, however, is the quality of the sand produced.
“Wisconsin frac sand has an advantage over sand from Texas and other
states because it is exceptionally round and hard, which makes it better at
unlocking oil from deeper deposits of rock.”36 One of the major differences
between Texas’ Brown sand and Northern White is the compressive
strength, also known as “crush strength.” Brown sand has a lower
compressive strength of 4,000 to 8,000 psi, compared with Northern White
which has a compressive strength of over 8,000 psi.37 In other words,
Brown sand is more suitable for shallow wells and formations that have low
fracture closure stress, while Northern White sand can withstand deeper
wells and formations with higher stresses. “[Northern White] sand actually
does a better job in the long run, but right now cheaper costs are the most
important factors for producers.”38 Furthermore, several risk factors exist
because “new in-basin sand is very different than northern white and other
brown sands”39 and there is “very little data to quantify the effect of usage
of in-basin sands on well productivity, estimated ultimate recovery[,] and
initial production rates.”40
III. Implied Covenants of Oil and Gas
A. The Oil and Gas Lease
Lessors and lessees enter into oil and gas leases with the purpose of
exploring, developing, and operating the premises to their mutual benefit.
Lessors prefer more encompassing provisions, while lessors would prefer
less. Because lessors and lessees cannot anticipate every possible situation
that will arise under the terms of the lease, courts have created legal rights
35. North American FracSand Consumption Will Grow, supra note 13.
36. Id.; see also Jordan Blum, Texas Frac Sand Mines Keep Opening, but Halliburton
Says Usage Slows, HOUSTON CHRONICAL (July 25, 2017, 2:12 PM),
http://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Texas-frac-sand-mines-keep-opening-but11368797.php.
37. North American FracSand Consumption Will Grow, supra note 13.
38. Keith Schaefer, The #1 Efficiency Gains in Energy Come From . . . Sand?, OIL AND
GAS INVESTMENTS BULLETIN, (Aug. 10, 2016), https://oilandgas-investments.com/
2016/stock-market/the-1-efficiency-gains-in-energy-come-fromsand/.
39. Tim Beims & Colter Cookson, Permian Driving Frac Sand Supply Shift, THE
AMERICAN OIL & GAS REPORTER, (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.aogr.com/magazine/fracfacts/permian-driving-frac-sand-supply-shift.
40. Jacob, supra note 33.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/5

2018]

Frac Sand, Hydraulic Fracturing & Implied Covenants

1403

called implied covenants that are inferred from the agreement between the
two parties when the lease remains silent.41 There are six major oil and gas
implied covenants:
(1) the implied duty to develop; (2) the implied duty to explore,
including a duty of further exploration in some states; (3) the
implied duty to protect against drainage; (4) the implied duty to
market, including the “marketable-product” rule with its effect
upon who bears marketability costs; (5) the implied duty to
accommodate; and (6) the implied duty of prudent operation for
the mutual benefit of the lessor and lessee.42
For the purposes of this Article, the implied duty to develop, the implied
duty to protect against drainage, and the implied duty of prudent operation
for the mutual benefit of the lessor and lessee will be the main focus.
B. The Reasonably Prudent Operator Standard
Implied covenants have been created by courts because leases do not
expressly define every duty or standard of a lessee. Most jurisdictions
follow the reasonably prudent operator standard to govern the duties of a
lessee under the lease. The reasonably prudent operator standard requires
“[w]hatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably expected of
operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the interests of both lessor
and lessee, is what is required.”43 The reasonably prudent operator standard
has the same purpose in oil and gas law as does the reasonable man
standard in negligence law:
This analogy to the reasonable man of tort law also helps to
explain the meaning of the prudent-operator standard. The
prudent operator is a reasonable man engaged in oil and gas
operations. He is a hypothetical oil operator who does what he
ought to do not what he ought not to do with respect to
operations on the leasehold. Since the standard of conduct is
objective, a defendant cannot justify his act or omission on
personal grounds or by reference to his peculiar circum41. Kenneth M. Klemm, Implied Covenants: Recent Developments in Failure-toDevelop Cases and Other Implied Obligations Under Mineral Leases, 57 ROCKY MT. MIN.
L. INST. 20-1, 3-4 (2011).
42. John Burritt McArthur, U.S. Oil and Gas Implied Covenants and Their Functions:
“As Much a Part of the Contract—Is as Effectually One of Its Terms—As if Had Been
Plainly Expressed,” 61 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 29-1, 7 (2015).
43. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905).
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stances. . . . In short, the question is not what was meet and
proper for this defendant to do, given his peculiar circumstances,
but what a hypothetical operator acting reasonably would have
done, given circumstances generally obtained in the locality.44
C. Implied Duty to Develop
It is easy to understand why a lessor and lessee have a common interest
in the development of an oil and gas lease. Both stand to profit from the
development if successful. Their interests, however, are not always as
common as one might think. For the lessor, more wells mean more money
because they do not have to share in the expenses of drilling the wells. On
the other hand, the lessee may have several reasons for delaying or deciding
not to develop further. Shortage of capital, scarcity of resources,
development of other leases, and belief that further development would not
be financially beneficial are just a few of the reasons a lessee might have
for not developing the lease. Thus, while a lessor has motivation to seek
more development, the lessee’s interests in development might not always
be paramount.
One of the leading implied covenant cases, Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc
Co.,45 involved a development dispute between lessor and lessee after the
express terms of the lease had been satisfied. The lease required that a well
be drilled within the five-year primary term to avoid termination.46 Lanyon
Zinc drilled a well in the fifth year of the lease, satisfying the express terms
of the lease.47 Lanyon Zinc made no other efforts to develop the lease after
completion of the first well, though other companies successfully drilled
adjacent to the Brewster lease. Brewster notified Lanyon Zinc in writing to
declare that the lease terminated and demanded surrender. After the demand
was not complied with, Brewster sued.48 Though Lanyon Zinc had satisfied
the expressed terms of the lease, avoiding the lease termination, the Eight
Circuit framed the question to be considered as:
The implication necessarily arising from these provisions—the
intention which they obviously reflect—is that if, at the end of
the five-year period prescribed for original exploration and
44. Johnson v. Hamill, 392 N.W.2d 55, 58 (N.D. 1986) (quoting 5 H. Williams & C.
Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 806.3, p. 42 (1985)).
45. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
46. Id. at 810.
47. Id. at 815.
48. Id.
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development, oil and gas, one or both, had been found to exist in
the demised premises in paying quantities, the work of
exploration, development, and production should proceed with
reasonable diligence for the common benefit of the parties, or the
premises be surrendered to the lessor.49
The court reasoned that absent express language in the lease, further work
should be left to an implication of the reasonably calculated intentions of
the parties as manifested in the lease, which was the production of oil and
gas to their mutual benefit.50 Furthermore, the contract did not stipulate that
if Lanyon Zinc found oil and gas in paying quantities, they must engage in
operation; but the agreement to pay royalties to Brewster implied that the
parties intended for Lanyon Zinc to operate the well.51 In other words,
“[w]hatever is necessary to the accomplishment of that which is expressly
contracted to be done is part and parcel of the contract, though not
specified.”52 Thus, the court held that the lease contained an implied
covenant to continue exploration, development, and production with
reasonable diligence after the primary term of the lease had expired.53
A lessee’s duty to develop is an objective standard. Reasonable
expectations are not based solely on the subjective view of the lessee only,
or on the lessor only.54 Therefore, a lessee only has a duty to develop if the
lessor proves that it would likely be profitable to develop. A lessee’s duties,
however, do not “carry the operations beyond the point where they will be
profitable to him, even if some benefit to the lessor will result from them.”55
Thus, a lessor cannot expect a lessee to conduct operations when the
expense would outweigh the profit, even if the lessor would benefit.
D. Development Through Operations Other Than Drilling
Compliance with the implied duty to develop is not limited to drilling.
Operators have many ways of enhancing production that have advanced as
the oil and gas industry has evolved. Taking into account Brewster, the
explanation of the reasonably prudent operator’s duty to develop can
encompass development activities other than drilling. Indeed, several courts
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 810.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 813–14.
Id. at 814.
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have dealt with duties to develop that arise out of activities other than
drilling.56 In one case, a court held that failure to fracture a well was a
breach of the implied covenant to develop. In Crocker v. Humble Oil &
Refining Co.,57 lessors brought an action for cancellation of an oil and gas
lease after demand of additional drilling within sixty days was not met. The
original lease had been divided into two parts by Humble, with wells drilled
on both. But, over thirty-seven years had passed since a well had been
drilled on the lease.58 Humble contended that the delay was prudent and
proper because they were in negotiations to create a waterflood unit on one
part of the lease, and the drilling of an additional well would interfere with
those negotiations.59 Looking at whether the delay was prudent and proper
in light of the circumstances, the court found that delay of development of
the portion of the lease that included the waterflood unit was reasonably
prudent.60 The court explained, however, that “the standard of prudent
operations to which a defendant should be held responsible is determined
by the skills and knowledge then available.”61 During the years in which
development was delayed, sandfracing had been discovered and
commercially introduced; moreover, Humble and others had used
sandfracing in the area.62 Evidence indicated that a well drilled on the other
portion of the lease with the use of sandfracing would probably be
profitable.63 As such, the court found that Humble had not acted as a
reasonable prudent operator in delaying development of the portion of the
lease not included in the waterflood program.64
In another duty to develop case, Waseco Chemical & Supply v. Bayou
State Oil,65 the court held that failure to employ known successful recovery
56. See e.g., Clifton v. Kuntz, 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959) (discussing that operator
could have been liable for unreasonable failure to rework the well had duty been breached);
Wadkins v. Wilson Oil Co., 6 So. 2d 720, 721 (La. 1942) (explaining that the operator was
in breach for not developing wells “in accordance with the new and successful methods of
development used by others in this . . . oil field.”); Myers v. Shell, 110 P.2d 810 (Kan. 1941)
(discussing whether there was an implied duty to deepen a gas well into a gas and oil well,
but holding that plaintiff had not met its burden of proof showing that a prudent operator
would have done so).
57. 419 P.2d 265 (Okla. 1965).
58. Id. at 271.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 272–73.
61. Id. at 272.
62. Id. at 271.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 274.
65. 371 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 1979).
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methods amounted to a failure to prudently operate and develop lease as a
reasonably prudent operator would have. Bayou State Oil acquired the lease
which contained about fifty existing wells.66 In the following twenty-four
years, Bayou State Oil drilled no additional wells on the lease.67 During that
time, lessees on adjacent properties employed a secondary recovery
technique called fireflooding.68 The fireflooding method successfully
produced about sixty percent of the oil in place, while the method used by
Bayou State Oil only produced about five percent.69 Additionally, the
royalties from the fireflood technique amounted to $1200 per acre per
month versus less than $3 per acre per month under the method employed
by Bayou State Oil.70 Based upon the circumstances, the court found that
Bayou State Oil “failed in its obligation of diligent development [as a
reasonably prudent operator] of the Scanland lease for the benefit of itself
and lessors.”71
Lessees must be mindful that the implied covenant of duty to develop is
not solely limited to drilling additional wells. The duty may apply to
enhanced recovery methods, horizontal drilling, reworking, and other
activities as much as it does to drilling. It must be pointed out, however,
that the facts must still show that a reasonably prudent operator would
choose to develop under similar circumstances, while also considering
profitability. Lessors cannot demand development because it would be
profitable to them, the development must reasonably be to the mutual
benefit of both the lessor and lessee.
E. Implied Duty to Protect Against Drainage
Oil and gas reservoirs are not perfectly located within property lines.
Because oil and gas are fluid in nature, flow to different areas in the
reservoir often crosses property lines. Consequently, the oil and gas
industry was shaped by the “rule of capture,”72 under which one who brings
66. Id. at 311.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 311–12.
69. Id. at 312.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 307.
72. 5 Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW
§ 822.3 (2017) (“In short, under the Rule of Capture, a landowner has title to the oil and gas
he produces from his land, wherever the mineral may have been located originally. It is
immaterial that some of the oil or gas now in place may have come from the land of others;
the mineral is now subject to the physical control of the lessee and legally will be the
property of the lessee and lessor when produced.”).
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oil and gas to the surface is said to have captured and now owns the severed
product. As a result, a well on an adjacent property can legally drain oil and
gas from a neighboring property, as long as, the drainage is through
underground migration that is then produced within the property lines of the
adjoining well. Thus, drainage has the potential to deprive both the lessor
and lessee of economic benefits. As a result, courts have imposed the duty
to protect against drainage upon lessees before oil and gas migrates to a
neighboring well.
A lessee’s duty to protect against drainage requires the lessee to drill an
offset well or protect the leased premises from a well drilled on neighboring
property.73 Like a lessee’s duty to develop, courts employ the prudent
operator standard in determining if the lessee has breached the implied duty
to protect against drainage, by failing to drill an offset well. Furthermore,
one of the key factors in the determination of whether a lessee acted as a
prudent operator in protecting against drainage is profitability.74 In other
words, would a prudent operator drill an offset well to protect against
drainage if doing so would be profitable, but not drill the offset well if it
would be unprofitable.
To establish a breach of the implied duty to protect against drainage, the
lessor must prove: “(1) that substantial drainage has taken place on the
leasehold; and (2) that an offset well would produce oil and gas in paying
quantities, i.e. in sufficient quantities to repay the cost of drilling,
equipping, and operating the well and to return a profit on the
investment.”75 Occasionally courts have suggested that substantial drainage
and production in paying quantities are interchangeable; meaning that there
is not substantial drainage unless there is enough oil and gas in place to
recoup the costs of operation and drilling with additional profit.76 However,
courts that treat substantial drainage as an independent requirement are
justified in doing so because a lessor who proves that an additional well
would be profitable, but fails to prove substantial drainage, has merely
73. See, e.g., Thoroughbred Assns., L.L.C. v. Kan. City Royalty Co., L.L.C., 248 P.3d
758, 771 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011); Sundheim v. Reef Oil Corp., 806 P.2d 503, 508 (Mont.
1991); Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 432 F.2d 165, 171 (5th Cir. 1970); Indian
Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rosamond, 120 P.2d 349, 352 (Okla. 1941).
74. See, e.g., Olsen v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 212 F. Supp. 332, 333 (D. Wyo. 1963);
Rosamand, 120 P.2d at 352; Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex.
1981) (citing Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 695–96 (Tex. 1959)).
75. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 72, § 822.
76. Id. § 822.1; Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Andreae, 245 Miss. 11, 147 So. 2d 116
(1962); Shell Oil Co. v. James, 257 So. 2d 488 (Miss. 1971).
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proven that oil and gas exists in profitable quantities not that there has been
a permanent loss of oil and gas.77 The second element of proof, that an
offset well will produce in paying quantities, is distinguishable from the
meaning given in the habendum clause of an oil and gas lease. In relation to
the implied duty to protect against drainage, production in paying quantities
means: “such quantities as would lead a reasonably prudent operator to drill
the additional or off-set well with the expectation of recovering from
production the cost of drilling, equipping, and operating the well plus a
reasonable profit.”78 Thus, to establish a breach of implied duty to protect
against drainage, the lessor must establish that there is drainage from the
leased property, that the drainage is substantial, and that an offset well
would recover the cost and make a profit.
Another situation that arises in implied duty to protect against drainage
cases results when drainage is to a well drilled by the lessee on property of
another lessor, sometimes referred to as “fraudulent drainage.” There are
three general categories of these types of cases: (1) decisions reciting the
fact that the lessee caused the drainage, but because a prudent operator
would not have drilled to prevent drainage, recovery was denied; (2) cases
where the lessee has caused the drainage, but does not change the common
rules of liability for failure to protect against drainage; and (3) cases where
the lessee’s liability has been increased when they are the cause of drainage
on the leased property.79 Some courts have even held the lessee liable
without proof that an offset well would have been profitable. In Geary v.
Adams Oil and Gas Co.,80 the court found against lessee base upon a theory
of unjust enrichment:
But here the mind is haunted by the fact that the defendant is the
beneficiary of the oil drained from plaintiff’s land by the wells
on the north and the south which belong to the defendant. It has
not only been saved the cost of drilling, equipping, and operating
a protecting well but it gets the oil anyway without plaintiffs
being paid for it.81
Some scholars, however, oppose the idea that a lessee should be held liable
for drainage to another of the lessee’s wells without proof that an offset

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 72, § 822.1
Id. § 822.1; Whitaker v. Texaco, 283 F.2d 169, 175–76 (5th Cir. 1960).
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 72, § 824.
31 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Ill. 1940).
Id. at 834.
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well would be profitable.82 They suggest that the law should require no
more of the lessee than what a reasonably prudent operator would do if he
did not hold the adjoining lease.83 Furthermore, these scholars suggest that
only procedural changes are needed to place the burden of proof on the
defendant in showing that there is not production in paying quantities, for
which the lessee is usually more well informed.84
Courts enforced the implied duty to protect against drainage in a number
of ways: (1) cancellation of the lease; (2) conditional cancellation of the
lease; (3) cancellation combined with damages; (4) injunction to drill offset
well; and (5) damages for past and future loss.85 There are several cases,
however, which hold that cancellation of the lease is not available, and that
the only remedy is damages.86 Because the duty to protect against drainage
is an ongoing duty, the statute of limitations will not bar an action brought
too late after the cause first occurred.87 Although, in such a case, the
damages will be limited to those that occurred during the statutory limit
beginning just before the action is filed.88
F. Implied Duty of Prudent Operation
The implied duty of prudent operation for the mutual benefit of the lessor
and lessee is a catchall duty that covers those duties that do not fall within
the more recognized or specific implied covenants.89 It is viewed as an
expression of the more general duty of the lessee to perform in such a
manner as to achieve the purposes of the agreement in the oil and gas
lease.90 There are four general categories of disputes that fall within the
implied duty of prudent operation:
(1) claims by lessors that operations on the land have been
carelessly conducted causing damage to the royalty interests; (2)
claims by the lessor that premature abandonment of the lease has
damaged royalty interest; (3) claims by the lessor that lessee has
failed to maximize the recovery from the land by using advanced
production techniques; and (4) claims by the lessor that the lease
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 72, § 824.2.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 825.
Id.
Id.
See Rosamond, 120 P.2d 349.
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 72, § 861.
Id.
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failed to seek favorable action by the regulatory commission that
would have benefited the royalty interest.91
Some courts, however, may recognize a lessor’s claim against the lessee for
failure to maximize recovery from the land by using advanced production
techniques, as a duty to develop through operations other than drilling.92
G. State Laws Regarding the Implied Covenants
1. Texas
Texas courts view implied covenants to particular disputes under three
broad categories of implied covenants: (1) development of the premises, (2)
protection of the leasehold, and (3) management and administration of the
lease.93 Texas applies prudent operator standard to govern implied duties
that exist between lessors and lessees. “The standard of care in testing the
performance of implied covenants by lessees is that of a reasonably prudent
operator under the same or similar facts and circumstances.”94 In failure-todevelop cases, profitability plays an important role, as the critical question
is often whether the lessor can prove a reasonable expectation of profit to
the lessor and lessee.95 Thus, there is an obligation to develop a lease in
Texas, but it does not require the lessee to continue development if the
lessee can prove that further development would not be profitable.
In Texas, while a breach of a condition of the lease results in termination
of the lease, breach of an implied covenant does not automatically result in
termination.96 Courts generally prefer to impose monetary damages before
imposing cancellation of the lease.97 The statute of limitations for a breach
of implied covenant claims in Texas is four years.98
2. Oklahoma
In Oklahoma, courts view implied covenants as a part of the contract
under the oil and gas lease. Oklahoma recognizes the implied covenants to:
91. Id.
92. See infra Part III–D.
93. Amoco, 622 S.W.2d at 567.
94. Id. at 567–68.
95. Sun Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. 1989); see also Atl.
Richfield Co. v. Gruy, 720 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. App. 1986) (noting that “a prudent
operator would not drill absent some evidence the drilling would be profitable”).
96. Hitzelberger v. Samedan Oil Corp., 948 S.W.2d 497, 506 (Tex. App. 1997).
97. Id.; see also Coastal Oil & Gas Corp v. Roberts, 28 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. App.
2000) (noting that an oil and gas lease should be construed disfavoring forfeiture).
98. Amoco, 622 S.W.2d at 571.
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(1) explore, (2) develop, (3) diligently and properly operate the lease, and
(4) protect the lease from drainage.99 Oklahoma courts apply the prudent
operator standard to determine if an implied covenant exists. Furthermore,
in Oklahoma, a duty to develop does not exist where there is not a
reasonable expectation of profits.100
Lessors bringing claims for breach of an implied covenant may seek
termination of the lease or to recover monetary damages.101 Oklahoma
courts, however, generally require the lessor to send notice and demand of
compliance with the implied covenant and provide the lessee with a
reasonable opportunity to comply before granting a termination of the
lease.102 Because Oklahoma courts recognize implied covenants as being a
part of the contract, lessors must be aware of the five-year statute of
limitations for breach of contract claims.103
3. Kansas
The Kansas legislature has given courts the authority to enforce implied
covenants by passing the Kansas Deep Horizons Act.104 These statutes
assist the courts in analyzing these implied covenants in an oil and gas
lease. Section 55–223 states:
As a matter of Kansas public policy, all oil and gas leases and
subleases for the exploration, development and production of oil,
gas or other minerals, or any combination thereof, which are
held by production shall be presumed to contain, in addition to
any expressed covenants therein, an implied covenant to
reasonably explore and to develop the minerals which are the
subject of such lease. Such implied covenant shall be a burden
upon the lessee and any successor in interest.105
Kansas courts, following the Brewster opinion, apply the prudent operator
standard in evaluating implied covenants of an oil and gas lease. Like Texas
99. Ramsey Petroleum Corp. v. Davis, 85 P.2d 427, 429 (Okla. 1938).
100. See Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638, P.2d 441, 449 (Okla. 1981) (noting that
“the covenant for further development as it is interpreted in this jurisdiction while limiting
the duty to drill additional wells to those instances where a prudent operator would expect a
probability of potential profit from the well contemplated”).
101. See Rosamond, 120 P.2d 349 (Okla. 1941); Concorde Res. Corp. v. Kepco Energy,
Inc., 254 P.3d 734 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011).
102. Concorde, 254 P.3d at 742.
103. Rosamond, 120 P.2d at 354.
104. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55–223 through 229 (West 2017).
105. Id. § 55–223.
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and Oklahoma, Kansas courts recognize the lessee’s duty to develop, but
allow the lessee to consider their reasonable expectation of profitability.106
In failure-to-develop cases, the lessor has the burden of proving by
“competent evidence” that the lessee breached the implied covenant.107
Kansas courts may give a lessee, who breached an implied covenant, a
reasonable time to comply. Termination or monetary damages may are also
awarded at the determination of the courts.108 Kanas courts recognize that
implied covenants are implied in fact, and therefore are a part of the
contract.109 As such, a breach of an implied covenant in an oil and gas lease
is subject to Kansas’s five-year statute of limitations for contracts.110
4. New Mexico
New Mexico courts recognize the implied covenant of reasonable
development. In State ex rel. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Worden,111 New
Mexico acknowledged implied covenants in an oil and gas lease for the first
time. The Supreme Court of New Mexico stated:
There is an implied covenant on the part of the lessee (in the
absence of any expressed on the subject as in this lease) that
after production of oil and gas in paying quantities is obtained,
he will thereafter continue the work of development for
production of oil and gas with reasonable diligence as to the
undeveloped portion of the leased land.112
New Mexico also adopted the reasonably prudent operator standard. In
Libby v. De Baca,113 the court held that a lessee must use “reasonable
diligence, as viewed from the standpoint of a reasonably prudent operator,”
while accounting for his interest and the interests of the lessor.114
Breach of an implied covenant can result in the termination of the oil and
gas lease; however, courts may provide the lessee time to comply with the
106. See e.g., Rush v. King Oil Co., 556 P.2d 431, 435 (Kan. 1976) (“The large expense
incident to exploration and development, combined with the additional fact the lessee must
bear the loss of unsuccessful exploration and development, justifies the lessee in exercising
caution with regard to his own economic interests, as well as the interests of the lessor.”).
107. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55–224 (West 2017).
108. Id. § 55–226.
109. See Smith v. Amoco Prod. Co., 31 P.3d 255, 268 (Kan. 2001).
110. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60–511(1) (West 2017).
111. 103 P.2d 124, 127 (N.M. 1940).
112. Id. at 126 (citations omitted).
113. 179 P.2d 263 (N.M. 1947).
114. Id. at 265.
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obligations of the covenant.115 There is a six-year statute of limitations in
New Mexico for written contracts,116 but the courts have yet to decide this
issue with respect to implied covenants in an oil and gas lease.
5. Colorado
Colorado views implied covenants under four simple categories: (1) duty
to drill, (2) duty to develop after discovery of oil and gas in paying
quantities, (3) duty to operate diligently and prudently, and (4) duty to
protect against drainage.117 The performance required to comply with an
implied covenant is the prudent operator standard. “Whether the lessee
exercised the diligence proper under the circumstances to operate the lease
is determined by whatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably
expected of all operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the
interests of both lessor and lessee.”118 Colorado courts, however, have held
that “the implied covenant of reasonable development requires a
determination that additional development will be profitable.”119 Thus, a
lessee is allowed to take into account his reasonable expectation of profits
when deciding whether to further develop.
In Colorado, a lessor may bring a claim for termination of the lease if
breach of an implied covenant has occurred, and the termination may be
full or partial, depending on the circumstances of the breach.120 There is a
three-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims in Colorado.121
6. Wyoming
Wyoming law acknowledges implied covenants in oil and gas leases.
The courts have established that oil and gas leases contain an implied
covenant of development.122 The Supreme Court of Wyoming also follows

115. Id. at 266 (“We will direct the trial court to modify its decree and deny cancellation
of the interests of such defendants in the lease on the forty acre tract on which the paying
well was completed in December, 1938, on the condition that they proceed with reasonable
diligence to market the gas from the well . . . .”).
116. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37–1–3 (West 2017).
117. Davis v. Cramer, 837 P.2d 218, 222 (Colo. App. 1992) (citing Mountain States Oil
Corp. v. Sandoval, 125 P.2d 964 (Colo. 1942)).
118. Davis, 837 P.2d at 222–23 (internal quotations omitted).
119. Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 372 (Colo. App. 1984); see also
Whitham Farms, LLC v. City of Longmont, 97 P.3d 135, 137–38 (Colo. App. 2003).
120. Davis, 837 P.2d 218; Gillette, 694 P.2d 369; Whitham Farms, 97 P.3d 135.
121. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–80–101 (West 2017).
122. Sonat Expl. Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 710 P.2d 221, 225 (Wyo. 1985).
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the prudent operator standard developed in Brewster.123 Additionally, in
contemplating reasonable prudence, courts “consider whether further
drilling would prove profitable, not only to the lessor but also to the
lessee.”124 In other words, like other states, profitability is a critical factor in
determining breach of implied covenants in Wyoming. Termination of the
oil and gas lease is allowed for a breach of an implied covenant. While it is
unclear how the statute of limitations would apply to a breach of an implied
covenant in oil and gas leases, Wyoming has a ten-year statute of
limitations for written contracts and an eight-year limit for unwritten
contracts.125
7. North Dakota
In North Dakota, while the courts do recognize implied covenants in oil
and gas leases, they have referred to the covenants “to reasonably develop”
and “further exploration” together.126 With regard to the implied covenant
of reasonable development, the Supreme Court of North Dakota stated:
The law is well settled that the lessee in any oil and gas lease has
an implied obligation to the lessor to do everything that a
reasonably prudent operator should do in operating, developing
and protecting the property with due consideration being given
to the interests of both the lessor and lessee, if there is no express
clause in the lease relieving the lessee of this implied duty.127
Thus, North Dakota courts use the reasonably prudent operator standard in
determining whether a lessee has breached an implied covenant of an oil
and gas lease.128
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has held that several factors are
taken into consideration when applying the prudent operator standard to a
lessee’s actions:
(1) the quantity of oil and gas capable of being produced as
indicated by prior exploration and development; (2) the local
market and demand therefor; (3) the extent and results of the
123. Id.; see also Phillips v. Hamilton, 95 P. 846 (Wyo. 1908).
124. Id. at 228.
125. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1–3–105(a) (West 1993).
126. Johnson, 392 N.W.2d at 57.
127. Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d 829, 835 (N.D. 1969).
128. See, e.g., Olsen v. Schwartz, 345 N.W.2d 33, 39 (N.D. 1984) (noting that “whether
or not there has been reasonable development of a leasehold is determined by reference to
the ‘prudent operator’ standard”).
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operations, if any, on adjacent lands; (4) the character of the
natural reservoir—whether such as to permit the drainage of a
large area by each well; (5) the usages of the business; (6) the
cost of drilling, equipment, and operation of wells; (7) the cost of
transportation, storage, and the prevailing price; (8) general
market conditions as influenced by supply and demand or by
regulation of production through governmental agencies; (9)
evidence of the willingness of another operator to drill on the
tract in question; (10) the attitude of the lessee toward further
development; and (11) the elapsed time since drilling operations
were last conducted.129
In North Dakota, the lessor has the burden of proving breach of an implied
covenant. Furthermore, the “lessor alleging breach of implied covenants is
not entitled to forfeiture of a lease until he has notified the lessee of the
breach, demanded that the terms of the implied covenant be complied with
within a reasonable time, and given the lessee a reasonable time for such
compliance.”130 North Dakota contract law provides for a six-year statute of
limitations for breach of contract claims.131
8. Louisiana
In Louisiana, the Louisiana Civil Code and the Louisiana Mineral Code
provide the authority to enforce implied covenants. Section 122 of the
Louisiana Mineral Code132 states:
A mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor,
but he is bound to perform the contract in good faith and to
develop and operate the property leased as a reasonably prudent
operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor. Parties
may stipulate what shall constitute reasonably prudent conduct
on the part of the lessee.133
Additionally, Article 2683 of the Louisiana Civil Code stipulates the lessee
has the obligation of using “the thing as a prudent administrator and in
accordance with the purpose for which it was leased.”134

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Johnson, 392 N.W.2d at 57–58.
Id. at 58 (citing Olsen, 345 N.W.2d at 40).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28–01–16 (West 2017).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:1 through 217 (West 2017).
Id. § 31:122.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2683(2) (West 2017).
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While the Mineral Code and the Civil Code do not define implied
covenants into specific categories, the comment to Section 122 of the
Louisiana Mineral Code does provide:
In Louisiana, the general obligation to act as a “good
administrator” or “prudent operator” has been clearly specified
in four situations: (1) the obligation to develop known mineral
producing formations in the manner of a reasonable, prudent
operator; (2) the obligation to explore and test all portions of the
leased premises after discovery of minerals in paying quantities
in the manner of a reasonable, prudent operator; (3) the
obligation to protect the leased property against drainage by
wells located on neighboring property in the manner of a
reasonable, prudent operator; and (4) the obligation to produce
and market minerals discovered and capable of production in
paying quantities in the manner of a reasonable, prudent
operator.135
Louisiana courts have held that a lessee has a duty to develop the
producing formation in a manner of a reasonably prudent operator, taking
into account his interests as well as the interests of the lessor.136 The
Supreme Court of Louisiana held that reasonable development is a
“question of fact which must be resolved by a consideration of the facts and
circumstances shown in the particular case.”137 Louisiana courts have
developed six factors to apply in determining whether a lessee has breached
an implied covenant: (1) geological data, (2) number and location of wells
drilled, (3) productive capacity of existing wells, (4) cost of drilling versus
reasonably expected profit, (5) lapse of time between last well completed
and demand for further operations, and (6) consideration of the acreage
involved in the lease.138 Thus, Louisiana courts apply a fact specific
analysis to determine whether a lessee has acted as a prudent operator in
breach of implied covenant cases.
Like other states, Louisiana requires the lessor to give notice and demand
for default of compliance before claiming breach. By placing the lessee in
135. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:122.
136. See generally Goodrich v. Exxon Co., USA, 608 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1992);
see also Carter v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 36 So. 2d 26, 28 (La. 1948) (noting that reasonable
development by the lessee is what is expected of persons of ordinary prudence in similar
circumstances, while having due regard for the interest of both parties).
137. Carter, 36 So. 2d at 26.
138. Goodrich, 608 So. 2d at 1023.
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default, the lessor gives notice of the alleged breach of the implied
covenant, and allows the lessee a reasonable opportunity to comply with the
demand.139 The courts, however, have held that notice and demand of
default letters that only demand release of the oil and gas lease, are
insufficient to place the lessee in default.140 Failure to properly place the
lessee in default can be raised as a defense to such a claim.
In Louisiana, the lessor has the burden of proof in showing that a lessee
has not acted as a reasonably prudent operator in performing his obligations
under an implied covenant. If the lessor proves that “a mineral lease is
violated, an aggrieved party is entitled to any appropriate relief provided by
law.”141 Comment to Section 134 of the Louisiana Mineral Code provides:
Although the remedy of specific performance has not been
granted in Louisiana where the demand is for compliance with
an obligation[] such as one to drill a well, the remedy can be
appropriate, such as in the case of failure to pay royalties, if what
the lessor desires is payment rather than some other remedy, or
in the case of a lessee who seeks to have the lessor deliver the
lease premises to him for his enjoyment.142
Under Louisiana law, a claim for breach of implied covenant is subject to a
ten-year statute of limitations for personal actions.143
IV. Potential for Litigation
As previously discussed, the implied covenants of an oil and gas lease
have long been recognized as playing an important role in the obligations of
the lessor-lessee relationship. While implied covenant law provides a
foundation for resolving traditional controversies, the oil and gas industry
continues to evolve with new technologies. One thing that is certain, is that
there will continue to be unanticipated problems that arise from unforeseen
developments not covered by the oil and gas lease. Thus, the law of implied
covenants will continue to regulate the relationship between the lessor and
lessee.
With hydraulic fracturing playing an ever-expanding role in oil and gas
production, the sand needed to perform this enhanced recovery method is
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Hunt v. Stacey, 632 So. 2d 872, 876 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1994).
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:134.
Id.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3499 (West 2017).
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becoming a growing commodity. As consumption of frac sand has grown,
oil and gas operators realized that they must make plans to address their
future needs. One recent development is in-basin sand, which is in
abundance with a much lower cost of transportation.144 Much of the inbasin sand, however, is inferior in quality to that of the Northern White
sand once used for all hydraulic fracturing jobs. Potentially, the use of this
in-basin sand will result in lower production results. With this in mind, the
question raised from a legal perspective is whether an oil and gas operator
should have a duty to use the highest quality frac sand available in respect
to his obligations to the lessor. A few theories of potential litigation that
could result will now be explored.
A. Hypothetical Development and Drainage Issues
1. Breach of Duty to Develop
First, consider the following hypothetical: Texas-area operator finished
drilling well and is preparing operations for hydraulic fracturing of the well.
Operator, taking into account the recent downturn in the market, makes the
decision to acquire frac sand for the operation from an in-basin sand mine
in Texas. This sand is lower quality than that of the industry standard frac
sand that have optimal qualities145 typically used to fracture a well, but at a
significantly lower cost because the local sand is cheaper to transport than
the higher quality sand.146 The lower-quality sand is used to fracture the

144. See, e.g., North American FracSand Consumption Will Grow, supra note 13 (noting
that there are over 24 million metric tons of sand resource untapped in central Texas alone).
145. The qualities that make the sand optimal are hardness, sphericity, and uniformity of
size. Hardness is often referred to as “crush strength.” It is important because subsurface
forces will attempt to close the fractures after the fracing fluid exits during flowback of the
well. If the sand does not have the sufficient crush strength, some of the particles will be
break apart under the subsurface force that is attempting the close the fracture. If the
particles are crushed, they will not be as effective at propping open the fractures and the
crushed particles may partially block the open spaces between the other particles. Because
the oil and gas in the formation uses the spaces between the particles as pathways to flow
into the wellbore, the partial blockage of those pathways can reduce production rates.
Sphericity and uniformity of size are important because spherical particles that are uniform
in size will pack together more neatly with more open space between particles—thus leaving
more open space for fluid to flow—than particles of irregular size and shape.
146. See North American FracSand Consumption Will Grow, supra note 13 (Locallysourced frac sand, because of the lower cost of transportation, can reduce the cost to the
operator by as much as 50%–80%).
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well.147 The well begins producing in paying quantities but over time
production rates decline, and the well is producing at a rate twenty percent
less than other wells in the reservoir.
The question arises whether the operator has breached his implied duty
to develop. It could be argued that the operator has drilled the well and
performed additional operations to enhance production, but he has not done
so as the reasonable prudent operator would. While the operator is able to
offset the lower production rates with the savings from the lower cost of the
in-basin sand and still be profitable, the lessor does not share in those
savings but incurs a twenty-percent reduction in royalties from the lower
production rate. With this in mind, it could be argued that the operator has
the freedom to drill the well and conduct operations accordingly because he
bears the cost of development. Thus, it stands to reason that the operator
would drill the well in the most cost-efficient manner possible, without
jeopardizing the integrity of the well. The lessor, not sharing in the cost of
the drilling or operations, is neutral because they are unaffected until the
well starts producing. Here, however, even though the lessor does not share
in the costs of fracing the well, their share of royalties from the production
is directly affected by the operator’s decisions made during the fracing of
the well.
2. Breach of Duty to Protect Against Drainage
Now, consider another hypothetical: Texas-area operator has, again,
finished drilling well and is preparing operations for hydraulic fracturing of
the well. Operator, taking into account the recent downturn in the market,
decides to acquire frac sand for the operation from an in-basin sand mine in
Texas. The lower-quality sand is used to fracture the well. The well begins
producing in paying quantities but over time production rates decline, and
the well is producing at a rate twenty percent less than other wells in the
reservoir. Additionally, an adjacent well on the neighboring property,

147. It should be noted that not all hydraulic fracturing jobs require high quality (Tier 1)
frac sand. Lower quality sands are often used in shallow depth wells were high crush
strength in not need because the subsurface forces are lower than at deeper depths.
Additionally, other types of proppants might be used in hydraulic fracturing such as resincoated sand or manufactured ceramic particles. While these types of proppants are more
crush resistant, they typically are more expensive than sand.
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fractured using industry standard frac sand, is causing drainage from the
lessor’s leased property.148
Here the question arises whether the operator has breached his duty to
protect against drainage. One could argued that even though the operator
has drilled the well and taken steps to enhance production, he has not done
so as the reasonably prudent operator would. In this hypothetical, now not
only is the lessor receiving a reduced share of royalties, there is permanent
loss of oil and gas from under the leased property. Of course, the lessor
must show that there is substantial drainage149 and in this circumstance the
well has already been drilled. The lessee would likely argue that he
complied with his duty and that the rule of capture150 should preclude his
liability. Here again, the lessor’s share of royalties has been reduced not
only by the lower rate of production, but quite possible, permanently by the
drainage to the neighboring well as a direct result of the operator’s
decisions during the fracing of the well.
3. Breach of Duty to Protect Against “Fraudulent” Drainage
Finally, consider a third hypothetical: Texas-area operator has, again,
finished drilling well and is preparing operations for hydraulic fracturing of
the well. Operator, taking into account the recent downturn in the market,
decides to acquire frac sand for the operation from an in-basin sand mine in
Texas. The lower-quality sand is used to fracture the well. The well begins
producing in paying quantities but over time production rates decline, and
the well is producing at a rate twenty percent less than other wells in the
reservoir. Additionally, adjacent wells on the neighboring property that
surround the lessor’s property, fractured using industry standard frac sand,
are causing drainage from the lessor’s leased property. The adjacent wells
are also leased and operated by the operator, who has a more favorable
working interest, in regard to those wells, than provided for in the lease
with the lessor of the well in subject.151
148. For purposes of this hypothetical the proposed adjacent well was fractured using the
industry standard for frac sand for effect, but in theory it is irrelevant as long as there is
drainage from the lessor’s well to the adjacent well.
149. See supra notes 76–77.
150. See supra note 72.
151. For example, the lessee might have a seven-eighths working interest in the leases
surrounding the property of lessor whose lease was being drained, while holding only a fiveeighths working interest in the property being drained. It would be to the advantage of the
lessee to have more production on those properties with a seven-eighths working interest
because he would receive a larger share of the production, free from royalties.
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Here the question arises whether the operator has breached his duty to
protect against drainage. One might argue that even though the operator
drilled the well and took steps to enhance production, he has not done so as
the reasonably prudent operator would. In this third hypothetical, now not
only is the lessor receiving a reduced share of royalties and incurring a
permanent loss of oil and gas from under the leased property, it appears the
operator has potentially taken steps that could amount to “fraudulent
drainage.”152 In this situation, the lessee would likely have an even more
difficult argument of precluding liability by the rule of capture.153 Now, not
only have the decisions of the lessee during the fracing of the well directly
affected the lessor by reducing his share of royalties and drainage that
resulted in a permanent loss of oil and gas, but it has directly affected the
operator’s profitability.
B. Hypothetical Obstacles in Litigation
While each of these hypotheticals begins with the same basic premise,
each brings in a different set of facts that change the dynamic such that each
must be considered carefully. First, in each hypothetical situation, the
operator’s decisions must be looked at from the prospective of the
reasonably prudent operator standard.154 It should also be pointed out that in
all of these situations, the question of whether to drill a well (i.e. duty to
develop), or whether to drill an offset well (i.e. duty to protect against
drainage), is not at issue. The issue in these situations is whether the
operator acted reasonably prudent in the secondary recovery operations
done during the hydraulic fracturing stage of the operations.
In the first hypothetical, the lessor is perceivably receiving a reduced
share of royalties because of the lower rate of production. One issue, here,
is that the lessor would likely have to prove that the use of the lower-quality
sand decreased the ultimate recovery of the oil and gas under the lease, not
the rate of recovery.155 The operator would likely argue that the lessor has
not been damaged because the oil and gas remained in the formation until
produced over time. The operator could also argue that the well could be
reworked or re-fracture by a subsequent hydraulic fracturing job. However,
this raises another interesting point, should the lessor wish to have the well
152. See supra note 79.
153. See supra note 72.
154. See infra Part III–B.
155. See Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 117 W.Va. 650, 654, 187 S.E. 331, 338
(1936) (noting that there is no recognized principal by any court that would entitle a plaintiff
to quickest possible rate of return from their well).
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re-fractured the question becomes: whether the operator can take in to
account his reasonable expectation of profits in re-fracturing the well. If the
operator were allowed to take this into account, it could excuse his potential
breach of duty for not properly fracing the well in the first place. Further,
one might argue that once the well ceased to produce in paying quantities,
the lease would terminate, and the lessor could enter into another lease to
produce the remaining oil and gas. But, if it would not be profitable to the
first operator, it stands to reason that a subsequent operator would not find
it profitable to re-fracture the well, especially considering the well had now
ceased production.
Another potential obstacle is proof of the reduced rate of production.
While evidence of production rates in a particular field is likely obtainable,
there is a lot of unknown in the oil and gas industry. It might prove difficult
to ascertain how much the type of sand used in the hydraulic fracturing of a
particular well affected its production rates. Additionally, not every
hydraulic fracturing job is the same, as the number of stages and amount of
sand can vary greatly depending on the particular well.156 However, if it is
ascertained that production has declined from the use of lower-quality sand
compared with adjacent wells, then logically the lessor could argue that the
operator failed to act as a reasonably prudent operator and breached his
duty of reasonable development. Additionally, it would likely prove that
this affected the ultimate recovery and not merely the rate of recovery, as
the lower-quality sand allowed the fractures to close and clog up the
passageways for the oil and gas to flow out of the formation.
In the second hypothetical, the lessor is not only perceivably receiving a
reduced share of royalties because of the lower rate of production, but also
there is permanent loss of oil and gas from under the leased property. In
addition to the obstacles discussed in the first hypothetical, the issue here is
that the lessor must show that there has been substantial drainage that
resulted in permanent loss. The permanent loss may prove more difficult
because the lessor is not dealing with the typical duty to protect against
drainage, which usually involves the drilling of a protection well to protect
the lease. Here, the theory is that the drainage from the lease stemmed from
the use of lower-quality sand used in the hydraulic fracturing of the well,
which in turn led to a lower rate of production. The lower-quality sand
usage, therefore, led to oil and gas that was not recovered migrating outside
of the lease and being recovered by adjacent wells. The most difficult part
of proving this theory is connecting the dots to show the domino effect that
156. See generally Schaefer, supra note 38.
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eventually led to the drainage. Indeed, it may prove difficult to ascertain
how much the lower-quality sand affected the rate of production, how much
oil and gas was left in the formation, how much oil and gas was drained,
and if that amount was substantial.
In the third hypothetical, which is a very narrow and specific set of
circumstances, not only is the lessor receiving a reduced share of royalties
and incurring a permanent loss of oil and gas from under the leased
property, but it appears the operator has taken steps that could amount to
“fraudulent drainage.” Now, not only must the dots connect between the
rate of production, how much oil and gas were left in the formation and
drained by nearby wells, in addition, it must show that the operator’s
operations were the cause of the drainage. While substantial drainage must
be shown, some courts place a lesser burden of proof on the lessor when the
operator and not a third party is the cause of drainage.157 In addition, one or
more of the elements generally required of the lessor is sometimes
eliminated, or the usually available defenses to the operator is denied.158
Here, while the difficulties of the second hypothetical remain, given the
facts that the lessee caused the drainage on adjacent leases where the lessee
had a more favorable working interest, it is perceivable that a lessor would
have a strong suit, especially given the courts’ attitude towards fraudulent
drainage cases.
In all of the hypotheticals, the first and perhaps biggest obstacle is
proving that the operator has not acted as a reasonably prudent operator.159
This obstacle may be difficult to overcome if several operators are also
using in-basin sand because one could argue that it is an accepted practice
within the industry. Further, operators may argue that they are responding
to the market and its economics because the cost, logistics, and
transportation of frac sand from the northern Midwest has proven difficult.
Based on the large amounts of sand being consumed on a year to year basis
alone,160 has arguably made it necessary for operators to look for
alternatives. Keep in mind, however, the reasonably prudent operator
standard requires “[w]hatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably
expected of operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the interests of
both lessor and lessee, is what is required.”161

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

WILLIAMS & MYERS, supra note 72, § 824.
Id.; see also supra note 80.
See supra note 72.
See supra note 24.
Brewster, 140 F. at 814.
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Finally, it should be pointed out that these hypotheticals are merely that,
hypothetical. It is purely speculation as to how the courts would come down
on these issues. But, what is important, is to keep in mind that the oil and
gas industry will continue to evolve, and new technologies will continue to
develop. As it does, the traditional notions of implied covenants to the oil
and gas lease should evolve with it because new technologies bring about
new problems. One being that Operators are usually in a much better
position to understand the complexities. Courts should avoid rigid
interpretation of the implied covenants to protect the lessors and royalty
interest owners that are less knowledgeable. Thus, operators should have
the freedom to innovate and become more efficient; it just should not be at
the expense of the lessors and royalty interest owners.
V. Conclusion
Oil and gas operators must continue to be cognizant, not only of the
bottom line but also of lessors and the obligations owed to them. The law of
implied covenants helps to regulate the relationship between operators and
lessors, but these laws must be able to adapt as new issues arise out of this
relationship. New sources of frac sand while economically beneficial to the
operator in the short term, could potentially have unintended consequences
for lessors and operators in the long term. Operators should further consider
the effects of using in-basin sand, how it could harm production rates, how
that could harm them financially, how that could harm lessors and royalty
interest owners, and how it could lead to potential litigation. One must
remember, sometimes efficiency is not always efficient. As Robert Herrick
wrote, “‘Tis haste Makes waste.”

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

